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Key points 
 Despite the proven success of the EU’s enlargement policy over the past few years, 
criticism within the EU member countries has grown. 
 While the European Commission’s enlargement strategy for 2014-15 reaffirms the 
importance of placing fundamental reforms relating to rule of law, economic 
governance and public administration reform at the heart of the negotiation 
process, the latest Progress Reports present a rather bleak picture on the state of 
reforms in the candidate countries. 
 Major efforts are required to maintain the credibility of the enlargement policy and 
demonstrate to an increasingly sceptical public that the transformative power of the 
EU continues to work. To achieve this, the EU needs to reinvigorate its strategy by 
adopting a more consistent and determined approach. 
Recommendations 
1. The EU should strengthen the benchmarking process with more interim benchmarks 
and the adoption of ‘road maps’ in all policy areas so as to better assess a country’s record 
in legislation adopted and implementation of reforms; the visa liberalisation experience 
offers a good example in this respect. 
2. The EU should ensure that legislation should not be deemed adopted until: 
i) sufficient government funding is included for its implementation; (the Reports 
contain many examples of bodies established to oversee implementation of 
legislation, such as on anti-discrimination, but which are not able to function due 
to lack of funds); and 
ii) an inclusive consultation process with civil society and other actors in society has 
been undertaken to ensure their views are taken into account. 
3. The EU should ensure more systematic and inclusive cooperation with civil society; 
this should form an integral part of its work both at Headquarters and by the EU 
Delegations in the field; it should include enhanced funding for organisations at local 
community and grass roots level, particularly in multi-ethnic communities.  
2 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ 
 
4. The EU should be more pro-active in defence of media freedom, particularly in 
speaking out when violations against media freedom, including harassment and selective 
judicial proceedings against individual journalists, occur; it should provide direct 
financial support for investigative reporting; EU delegations should also be instructed to 
use their not inconsiderable budgets to support such initiatives. 
5. The EU should continue to prioritise the need for sustained political dialogue, and 
focus greater efforts in promoting cooperation and consensus-building mechanisms 
between political parties and other actors in society; it should provide targeted support 
in particular for the youth branches of political parties. 
6. The European Commission should use a more user-friendly and less bureaucratic 
language in the Reports; it should refrain from using the phrase “The Commission 
considers that the political criteria continue to be sufficiently met”, if it does not reflect 
reality on the ground. 
7. The European Commission should engage the member states in a serious discussion 
on designing a mechanism where bilateral disputes can be addressed without affecting 
the conduct of the enlargement process itself. 
8. The incoming High Representative/Vice President and Commissioner for 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations should undertake a joint initiative 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina to encourage the leadership following this month’s elections 
to adopt a major reform programme; it should engage with civil society to ensure an 
inclusive approach.  
9. The European Parliament should ensure that individual MEPs are encouraged to play 
a more constructive role in support of the EU’s reform efforts in its enlargement strategy 
and promote greater respect for the democratic process in the candidate countries. 
 
Introduction 
It is a damning reflection of our times that one of 
the EU’s most successful foreign policy 
achievements has never been under so much 
criticism. During the recent elections for the 
European Parliament, populist eurosceptic 
parties were in the forefront of those 
campaigning against the EU’s enlargement 
agenda. Their attempts at equating further 
enlargement with the dangers of increased 
immigration from Turkey, the Western Balkans 
and even other EU member states were bolstered 
by the leaders of some long-standing member 
states, such as the UK, openly calling for 
                                                   
1 Statement by Jean-Claude Junker when presenting 
the political guidelines for the next Commission, 
Strasbourg, 15 July 2014 
restrictions on freedom of movement – one of the 
fundamental pillars of the EU. 
The statement by Commission President 
designate Jean-Claude Juncker that there will be 
no enlargement of the EU during his mandate in 
the next five years,1 while it will have gone down 
well with the eurosceptic parties, it had the 
opposite effect in countries waiting to join the 
EU. Even if Juncker’s statement was technically 
correct in the sense that none of the accession 
negotiations currently under way are anywhere 
near completion, nevertheless there were many 
in the Balkan region who took this statement as 
undermining the EU’s longstanding 
commitment to the accession prospects of the 
countries from that region. 
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It took Chancellor Merkel’s initiative of 
convening a Balkan summit in Berlin at the end 
of August to redress the situation. The summit 
brought together the leaders of all the Balkan 
countries and set in motion a four-year 
framework aimed at keeping the pressure on 
those countries to fulfil their reform 
commitments while seeking to reaffirm the EU’s 
commitment towards the Western Balkans. The 
so-called ‘Berlin process’, which follows on 
previous initiatives such as the ‘Brdo-Brioni 
process’, 2  will continue with the next summit 
being hosted by Austria in 2015. Whether the 
Chancellor’s welcome initiative receives the full 
backing of the other EU member states remains 
to be seen. 
It was the European Commission’s turn to take 
centre stage on the EU’s enlargement agenda 
earlier this month when it presented its 
enlargement strategy for the coming year 
together with the annual Progress Reports.  
Enlargement legacy of the Barroso II 
Commission 
This being the last ‘enlargement package’ of the 
current Commission, it offers a good opportunity 
to examine its record over the past five years. 
Certainly there is much to be proud of. Accession 
negotiations were successfully concluded with 
Croatia, eight years after being launched in 2005 
and after overcoming a difficult border dispute 
between that country and Slovenia. During the 
past year, negotiations were launched with both 
Montenegro and Serbia, Albania was granted 
candidate status last June, while albeit very 
modest progress has been made in the ongoing 
but painfully slow negotiations with Turkey, 
which were themselves launched in 2005. Finally 
the first step on the road to the EU was taken by 
Kosovo with the initialling of the Stabilisation 
                                                   
2 Launched in 2010 as the ‘Brdo process’, (from the 
location where it took place outside of Ljubljana),in 
Slovenia, together with Croatia, and expanded in 2013 
to become the ‘Brdo-Brioni process’, the process aims 
to create an informal political dialogue between the 
leaders of the Western Balkans and the EU. The 
and Association Agreement last July, a landmark 
achievement in itself, considering the fact that 
five EU member states still do not recognise 
Kosovo.  
Another positive development was the 
Commission’s initiative of placing the rule of law 
at the heart of the accession process, in order to, 
using its own words “address fundamental 
reforms early in the enlargement process”. 
Starting with the enlargement strategy of 2012 
when this new approach was incorporated, the 
Commission added ‘economic governance’ last 
year, and in this year’s strategy, it completed the 
‘triptych’ by adding ‘public administration 
reform’.  
Certainly this approach makes good sense. The 
levels of corruption coupled with weak 
institutions and highly politicised public 
administrations are like a cancerous growth 
across much of the Balkan region, as well as in 
Turkey. It is only by tackling those fundamental 
weaknesses head on that successful reforms can 
emerge and bring lasting benefits for the 
countries concerned. Even if this approach makes 
the process more challenging for the candidate 
countries in that it raises the threshold at the 
initial phase of the negotiations, if consistently 
applied, it will nevertheless bring dividends in 
the long term. A good example of this was the 
visa liberalisation process for the Balkan region, 
which contained a comprehensive list of complex 
reforms together with ‘road maps’ that each 
country had to comply with. 
A bleak picture 
Where the Commission has been less successful, 
however, is in the overall impact of its 
enlargement strategy in promoting effective 
reforms in the countries concerned in the past 
two to three years. The latest Progress Reports 
objectives include ‘creating a positive atmosphere, 
strengthening reconciliation and mutual cooperation 
and resolving political questions between neighbors 
and the broader region’. Press Communique, 
Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the EU, 23 
July, 2013. 
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show a rather bleak picture, with modest 
progress in some countries (such as in Albania 
and Serbia), but clear regression in others (such 
as in Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Macedonia). 
The Reports are eloquent in their description of 
all that is wrong in the Balkan region – political 
interference in the judiciary, lack of any political 
dialogue between the political parties affecting 
the proper functioning of the Parliament, deeply 
polarised societies exacerbated by heightened 
inter-ethnic tensions, as well as levels of 
corruption that have not only not diminished, 
but in many instances have got worse. These 
grave problems affect not just the system of 
government but they also act as a serious 
deterrent to foreign investment and the creation 
of a regulated business environment. 
Even in policy areas where legislation is in place, 
implementation is often severely hampered due 
to the governments’ failure to earmark sufficient 
funding. For example, the Report for Macedonia 
states that the Commission for Prevention and 
Protection against Discrimination, established 
under the 2010 Law on Anti-Discrimination 
continues “to have insufficient financial and 
human resources to properly fulfill its mandate”. 
The sorry list goes on.  
Probably the most alarming aspect of this year’s 
assessment relates to the worsening media 
environment with persistent attacks on media 
freedom, including physical violence and 
intimidation as well as politically motivated 
judicial proceedings against individual 
journalists. For once, the language of the report is 
clear: “In some countries, a climate of fear and 
censorship is stoked by continuing violence and 
intimidation against journalists, with little 
success by the authorities in identifying and 
properly sanctioning perpetrators. Sometimes 
governments themselves contribute to an 
atmosphere which demonises as traitors 
journalists critical of government policy, leading 
to self-censorship”. 3  This dire situation also 
affects the EU’s reform efforts, with government 
                                                   
3 See page 14, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the 
supported media giving the general public a 
highly sanitised version of the main messages 
contained in the Progress Reports.  
The two countries with the lowest 
grades 
For the second year in a row, the most negative 
reports relate to the deteriorating political 
environment and lack of reforms in both Bosnia 
and Hercegovina and in Macedonia. For the 
latter country, the report is a clear warning that 
failure to address the growing concerns 
regarding politicisation of state institutions as 
well as independence of the judiciary and 
freedom of expression would result in the 
recommendation for opening negotiations to be 
withdrawn.( The report states “The Commission 
urges the authorities to take decisive action to 
address concerns about increased politicization 
and growing shortcomings with regard to the 
independence of the judiciary and freedom of 
expression so that its recommendation can be 
sustained in future years “). 
What a fall from grace for Macedonia, which just 
10 years ago was seen as the success story of the 
entire Balkan region. The Commission’s decision 
to maintain its recommendation for the 6th 
consecutive year in the expectation that it would 
spur a more determined effort by the 
government to fulfil its reform commitments has 
failed dismally, with further backsliding in many 
reforms, and failure to restore any political 
dialogue between the parties. This is by far the 
worst score card for Macedonia since the 
granting of candidate status in December 2005, 
and is a clear indictment of the current 
Government’s populist agenda. It begs the 
question as to whether the declared commitment 
of the main governing party, VMRO-DPMNE 
(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation-Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity), in power since July 2006, 
towards EU accession, is genuine. 
Committee of Regions; Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2014-15, Brussels 8 October 2014. 
Com (2014) 700 final provisoire. 
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As for Bosnia and Hercegovina, the report 
merely repeats the wording of last year: “The 
country remains at a standstill in the European 
integration process”. Despite enormous efforts 
and time invested by Commissioner Fule 
personally, political will on the part of the 
country’s leaders to promote the much-needed 
reforms remains absent. The results of the 
Parliamentary elections that took place earlier 
this month have only confirmed the political 
stalemate, and do not give much hope for any 
movement in the country’s journey towards the 
EU.  
It will require a more determined and more 
forceful effort by the EU to get the country out of 
the current blockage, with a greater focus on the 
role of civil society in the demand for change. The 
‘plenums’ that brought together citizens groups 
from across the ethnic divide earlier in the year 
clamoring for change demonstrated the strength 
of feelings in society, and the catalyst role that 
could be played by civil society in the search for 
change. This is the right moment to encourage a 
new approach from the country’s leaders, just 
after the elections that took place earlier this 
month. A more ‘hands-on’ policy by the EU and 
its international partners such as the US, to push 
the leadership to take on much-needed reforms 
is the only way forward. This could be a test case 
for deploying the combined efforts of the 
incoming Commissioner for Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes 
Hahn, together with the new High 
Representative/Vice President, Federica 
Mogherini. 
Benchmarks and road maps 
While much of the fault for this very mixed 
picture throughout the region lies mainly with 
the countries concerned and their lack of political 
will to promote meaningful reforms, it also raises 
serious questions regarding the EU’s overall 
strategy. The introduction of benchmarks as well 
as interim benchmarks in areas relating to the 
rule of law has helped to focus the minds of the 
countries concerned on what needs to be done, 
and acts as a pressure on these countries to 
deliver. This is certainly the case once accession 
negotiations have started, where EU leverage is 
greater. For example in the case of Montenegro, 
the EU has set 84 interim benchmarks in the 
negotiation Chapters relating to Judiciary and 
fundamental rights (Chapter 23), and Justice, 
freedom and security (Chapter 24). Should there 
be delays by Montenegro in meeting these 
benchmarks, the EU could invoke the so-called 
clause of “overall balance” (disequilibrium 
clause) in the negotiating framework, which 
would mean delaying the pace of negotiations 
overall until such time as these benchmarks are 
met.  
Whether it invokes this clause or not will be a 
measure of how the EU wants to maintain 
effective leverage in the enlargement process. It 
will need to be consistent in its approach, which 
has not always been the case in the past, with 
political expediency often overtaking the 
objective criteria. The same goes for the 
Commission which has erred by highlighting 
some important criteria such as political dialogue 
one year, and hardly mentioning it the following 
year, even though it clearly remains a major 
issue.  
A more effective way of gauging real progress on 
the ground in relation to implementation of 
reforms would be to enhance the interim 
benchmarking exercise and use it consistently 
across many policy areas, even beyond the three 
pillars contained in the “new approach”. A 
systematic use of ‘road maps’, similar to the ones 
used in the visa liberalisation exercise would give 
clear guidance in each policy area. This would 
also be a useful way of comparing progress 
between each country. As highlighted in a 
document from the European Stability Initiative: 
“Any assessment should encourage two types of 
comparisons: between the situation in the 
accession countries and EU standards, and 
among accession countries. Comparisons help 
both fairness and the strictness off assessments. 
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They encourage friendly competition and mutual 
learning from best practice”.4 
The Commission also needs to be clear and 
consequential in the language it uses in the 
Progress Reports. At the moment, the reports are 
difficult to digest, written in a rather wooden, 
bureaucratic language, which doesn’t do justice 
to the political nature of the exercise. They also at 
times lack logic. For example, for Macedonia, the 
report states that “the Commission considers that 
the political criteria continue to be sufficiently 
met”,5 even though the content of the report is a 
litany of failures in almost every reform area. If 
the Commission needs such a statement to justify 
maintaining its recommendation for negotiations 
to open, then this practice should be replaced by 
other arguments such as the need to ensure 
stability in the country to justify the opening of 
accession negotiations, which would be a more 
correct statement reflecting the reality in the 
country.  
More effective remedies 
The Commission also needs to be more effective 
and more consistent in the remedies it offers. In 
the area of media freedom, it should be much 
more pro-active in helping to redress the 
situation. It should speak out when violations 
against media freedom or politically motivated 
judicial proceedings of individual journalists 
occur. It is not a bi-annual Conference bringing 
media from all the region to Brussels, however 
praiseworthy that initiative is, nor one annual 
prize for investigative reporting that will make a 
difference. Nor will media laws by themselves 
solve the problem; indeed they could be used as 
a smokescreen by governments to increase their 
control over media. What is needed is a change 
of mindset and effective control mechanisms for 
example to prevent abuse of government 
advertising in the media or the use of public 
funds to promote partisan interests. 
                                                   
4 “Enlargement until 2020”, Gerald Knaus, European 
Stability Initiative, January 2014.  
5 See page 23, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Probably the best way to make governments 
more accountable would be for the Commission 
to provide direct financial support for 
investigative reporting throughout the region, 
using for example IPA (Instrument for Pre-
Accession) funds for that purpose. In addition 
the EU delegations should be instructed to use 
their not inconsiderable budgets (usually 
between 600.000 to over €1 million per country) 
to support such initiatives.  
Regarding the role of civil society, the welcome 
recognition contained in this and previous 
Progress Reports that “a strong civil society 
enhances political accountability and promotes 
deeper understanding of accession related 
reforms”, needs to be followed up more 
effectively. Laws should not be deemed adopted 
until there has been an inclusive consultation 
process with civil society and other actors in 
society depending on the subject matter of the 
legislation. Governments should be held 
accountable if they fail to properly consult with 
civil society in policy and decision making; it 
should be a specific condition established for the 
accession process.  
There also needs to be more systematic financial 
support for civil society organisations, 
particularly at local community and grass roots 
level where they can have maximum impact. 
This is particularly important in multi-ethnic 
communities, where mistrust between the 
different ethnic groups can be more effectively 
addressed through integrated education projects 
and other confidence building measures. 
Delegations should be instructed to continuously 
engage with such organisations in an inclusive 
manner, so as to encourage governments to be 
more open to civil society. By giving the example, 
it can give those organisations greater confidence 
in their dealings with government. This is 
particularly important for those organisations 
that are being targeted and marginalised by 
European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions; Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2014-15, Brussels 8 October 2014. 
Com (2014) 700 final provisoire. 
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governments for being openly critical of 
government policies.  
Economic and political governance – 
Two Sides of the Same Coin 
The Commission has announced in the Reports 
that it will strengthen its support for ‘economic 
governance’ and ‘competitiveness’ in the 
enlargement countries. Attending the “Western 
Balkans Six” Ministerial Conference about new 
economic governance and better connectivity in 
the region which took place in Belgrade on 
October 23rd (the first international conference 
with simultaneous participation of ministers 
from Serbia and Kosovo), Commissioner Fule 
together with Commission Vice President Jyri 
Katainen launched a new process to monitor 
Western Balkan countries’ measures to 
strengthen economies, boost competitiveness, 
growth, investments and job creation in the 
framework of the EU accession process.6 (6).  
Countries will from now on be asked to submit 
“National Economic Reform Programmes”, 
while the EU will provide “more guidance for 
reform priorities and better targeted IPA 
funding. This is certainly welcome, with so many 
of the Balkan countries suffering from structural 
impediments to the proper functioning of the 
labour markets, unacceptably high 
unemployment ,excessive dependence on 
foreign loans and low investment. Even those 
countries with comparatively higher growth 
rates are pursuing policies which have failed to 
promote jobs (e.g. Bosnia and Hercegovina with 
2.5% GDP growth and 27.5% unemployment, 
Macedonia with 2.9% GDP and 29% 
unemployment).7 Practical steps to address the 
root causes for the depressingly high numbers of 
youth unemployed should be the priority. 
                                                   
6  See http://ec.europa.eu/commission 2010-
2014/fule/headlines/news/2014/10/2014/1023_en.htm. 
7 See page 6, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of Regions; Enlargement Strategy and Main 
At the same time, with ‘economic governance’ 
and ‘political governance’ being two sides of the 
same coin, greater efforts are also needed to 
strengthen the latter. The failure of governments 
to promote political dialogue and consensus 
building seriously undermines the reform 
agenda in those countries and increases the deep 
polarization in society. There are too many 
examples, many of which are reflected in the 
Progress reports, where governments push 
through legislation and even Constitutional 
amendments without proper consultation 
process with the political parties let alone with 
civil society. This only contributes to further 
alienation, divisiveness and as well as a climate 
of fear and growing intolerance in society, 
especially towards minorities. 
The EU needs to reinforce its focus on proper 
functioning of the Parliament, regular political 
dialogue and the role of political parties and their 
youth branches where there are clearly major 
weaknesses yet to be addressed. The EU should 
provide targeted support through joint projects 
with specialized organisations such as the 
Westminster Foundation. 
The European Parliament should play a more 
constructive and active role in this respect. 
Unfortunately, there have been examples of some 
MEPs unscrupulously defending activities (such 
as in the area of media freedom and human 
rights) of their sister parties in government in 
candidate countries which are at variance with 
the EU’s reform agenda. This undermines the 
EU’s reform effort and weakens its leverage. To 
quote Heather Grabbe: “ The much larger role of 
domestic and party politics in the accession 
process will make it less predictable and more 
prone to special interest lobbying within the EU 
– reducing the consistency and credibility that 
are vital for the transformative effect to happen 
in the Balkans and Turkey.8 The Parliamentary 
Challenges 2014-14, Brussels 8 October 2014.Com 
(2014) 700 final provisoire. 
8 “Six lessons of Enlargement Ten years on: The EU’s 
Transformative Power in Reprospect and Prospect”, 
Heather Grabbe, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
2014, pp 1-17. 
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delegations established for each candidate 
country should ensure that their Members and 
the Parliament as a whole fully respect the reform 
agenda set out by the EU and encourage greater 
respect for democratic process.  
Enhanced Foreign Policy Dialogue 
The Commission has also recognized the need for 
a more strategic relationship with the candidate 
and prospective candidate countries, and the 
benefits from greater cooperation on foreign 
policy issues. To this end it has proposed that the 
relevant Chapter 31 in the negotiating process 
relating to Foreign Security and Defense Policy 
be addressed early with the negotiating 
countries. This dimension has certainly gained 
increased importance following developments in 
both the Middle East and Ukraine, and Russia’s 
more assertive foreign policy, although it could 
be argued that it is a measure of how far the EU 
still has to go in fostering a more strategic 
approach in its foreign policy thinking as well as 
greater coherence between the different 
institutions of the EU, that this issue warrants a 
specific mention in the Progress Reports. It is 
nevertheless a welcome initiative and will offer a 
valuable testing ground for the intense level of 
cooperation which will be required between the 
incoming High Representative/Vice President 
and the Commissioner designate for 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement 
Negotiations. 
A more strategic relationship will be particularly 
important in relation to both Serbia, and Turkey, 
all the more so now as the shadow of Russia 
looms larger across the Balkan region. As 
reflected in President Putin’s triumphal` visit to 
Belgrade recently, the relationship between 
Serbia and Russia remains imbued with deep 
sentiments of history and culture. While Serbia 
has made clear its choice for EU accession, it will 
be tempted in various instances to sit on the 
fence, as it did in relation to the sanctions 
                                                   
 
9 See p. 26, of Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, op. cit. 
imposed by the EU against Russia, although it 
wasn’t the only country in the Balkan region not 
to side with the EU in this instance. At the same 
time Serbia could be an important bridge from 
the Balkan region in relations with Russia, 
particularly as it prepares to assume the 
Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2015, adding an 
important dimension to future EU/Serbia 
relations. 
With Turkey being at the forefront of the 
unfolding Middle East turmoil as well as its 
membership of NATO, a more intense 
EU/Turkey foreign policy dialogue can only be 
beneficial for both sides. As underlined in the 
Progress Report, “The value of such cooperation 
is even clearer in light of considerable challenges 
posed by recent developments in our joint 
neighborhood including the Ukraine crisis”.9 
With accession negotiations moving at a snail’s 
pace if at all, this foreign policy dialogue, which 
should include regular EU/Turkey high level 
meetings, could also help to reinvigorate the 
accession process, and demonstrate to EU 
member states in the region, such as Cyprus, the 
value of intensifying the negotiations in the 
broader interests of stability in the region. 
Bilateral Disputes 
Finally, the EU will also need to understand that 
the credibility of the enlargement process 
remains in doubt so long as individual member 
states continue to take the accession process 
hostage to bilateral complaints, thereby 
undermining the element of fairness in the 
conditionality principle. The case of Cyprus in 
relation to Turkey, and Greece in relation to 
Macedonia come to mind. They are indefensible 
and only serve to fuel nationalist agendas which 
have more to do with the past than with the 
Europe of tomorrow. This year’s Progress 
Reports offer no new initiatives in this respect 
unfortunately. In relation to the 
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Greek/Macedonia dispute, the Report reflects a 
hint of exasperation as it notes “The failure of the 
Parties to this dispute to reach a compromise 
after 19 years of UN-mediated talks (…)”, and 
calls for resolute action as well as “proactive 
support from EU leaders”.10 
The incoming Commission will need to engage 
more forcefully with the EU member states and 
underline the importance of finding alternative 
solutions for channeling these bilateral disputes. 
It must remind the member states that the Balkan 
region in particular offers a more complex 
picture than any other previous enlargement 
exercises. The combination of weak institutions, 
a lack of experience in conflict resolution and 
little appetite for compromise has made the 
issues appear even more intractable for countries 
to resolve on their own. This poses a serious 
threat to the stability of the region. 
Even dispensing with the unanimity principle 
within the Council on enlargement issues should 
be considered as an option. This may appear 
radical for some, but continuing this practice 
only adds to the image of double standards on 
the part of the EU. There are in any case sufficient 
mechanisms built in to the accession negotiating 
process to allow individual member states to 
safeguard their individual interests throughout 
the process.
                                                   
10 Ibid., p. 23. 
Conclusion 
The incoming Commission will have a major task 
on its hands, not only to ensure that the 
transformative power of the EU, which has been 
so successful in previous decades, should 
continue to deliver, but also to convince an 
increasingly sceptical public on the merits of the 
EU’s enlargement agenda. It will need to devote 
more time and efforts in demonstrating to the EU 
member states the long term dividends for the 
EU of promoting stability in its nearest 
neighbourhood , of extending the frontiers of 
peace and security and creating viable economic 
conditions in candidate countries to reduce the 
temptation to emigrate. 
The EU also needs to understand that allowing 
double standards within the EU, and tolerating 
attacks on media and civil society such as those 
occurring in Hungary, greatly weakens the EU’s 
leverage vis a vis candidate countries. 
A more assertive, consistent and determined 
approach in pursuing the enlargement agenda 
over the next years will ensure that the candidate 
countries remain on track with their reforms. As 
will have been seen with previous enlargement 
exercises, the dividends are well worth the efforts 
both for the acceding countries and for the EU.  
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Goals 
• Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
• Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
• Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
• Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
• Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
